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UBI JUS NON REMEDIUM:
How INSUFFICIENT SECONDARY RULES DIMINISH THE COERCIVE
FORCE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS' PRIMARY RULES
Diane A. Desiertol
Introduction
The study of human rights under international law is a paradox of
contrasts. While States celebrate the progress of codification and development of
substantive norms on human rights, there is an almost incomprehensible silence on
the consensus for enforcement of such norms. In so doing, should the mere
recognition of the content of the right per se suffice for the international community?
Some quarters acknowledge that claims for a uniform system or procedure for the
enforcement of such right or to obtain redress for its violation have long become
stale demands, and would prefer to treat the issue as one of the typical tensions of
kx lata and kxferenda.
'in principk, human ights obhgations, like other international obligations, crate rights in the
promisees and afford them remedies. But whik State promisees are entitled to pursue such remedies,
they hate not heen sumfidentf motivated to do so and do not in fact do so....Many States, themselves
still lacking an entrenched human rights culture, themselves vulnerabk to charges of violation, are
reluctant to respond to a violation by anotherfriendly State of the human ights of the State's own
inhabitants."2
The ultimate result of the lacunae in universal or broad enforcement
standards and procedures is to vest more authority on governments to determine
the merits and manner of pursuing the claims of individuals against human rights
violators. Human rights victims have to contend with the bitter irony that the
'human scale and nature' of their rights is inevitably subject to the political
considerations of statecraft. Rights exist, remedies perbaps. And yet the right of any
person to an effective remedy is itself a substantive human rights norm. Various
international instruments3 embrace this principle, demonstrating at the very least
'B.S. Economics, University of the Philippines School of Economics (Summa cum laude, 2000).
Chair, Student Editorial Board, Philippine Law Journal, 2003-2004. Fourth Year, LI.B., University of the
Philippines College of Law.
2 L. HENKIN, International Law: Politics, Values and Functions, in 216 COLLECTED COURSES OF
HAGUE AcADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 at 251 (1989).
3 Art. 8 of the UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, G.A. Res. 217 (111), U.N. Doe.
A/810 (1948), provides: "Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals
for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or laws."; See Art. 2(3) of the
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (ICCPR), G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N.
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the opiniojuris of States that such a right exists, even if the manner of enforcement is
susceptible to divergence in practice and belief. Yet another instance where a right
exists, but the remedy may not.
The precise oxymoron not fully appreciated by traditional theorists on
remedies under international law is that injuries created by human rights violations
are received by inditiduals, and whatever injury the legal construct called the State
incurs is merely derivative therefrom. Such traditional theorists still rely upon the
doctrine of espousal of claims for injury to nationals, 4 principally based on the
general test of observance of the 'international minimum standard' of treatment of
aliens in one's territory:
The propriety of governmental acts should be put to the test of international
standards...The treatment of an alien, ii order to constitute an international
delinquency should amount to an outrage, to had faith, to willful neglect of
duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental action so far short of
international standards that every reasonable and impartial man would readily
recognize its insufficiency.5
\Without weakening the observation, it may still b5 conceded that remedies
for human rights violations under international law have certainly crossed the
GAOR Supp. No. 16 at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); Art. 6 of the INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE
LLIMIN ,TION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (CERD), 660 U.N.T.S. 195; Art. 2(c) of the
CONVENI ION ON TIlE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DIScrIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN (CEDAW),
G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 46 at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979); Art. I.I of the
CONVENTON AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR
PUNLIIMENT, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 AT 197 11984],
[hereinafter referred to as TORTURE CONVENTION]; Art. 16 of the CONVENTION ON TIHE RIGHTS OF THE
C tILD (CKc), G.A. Res. 44/25, annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 49 at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989); A:t.
11(3) of the AMERICAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, O.A.S..S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; Art. 8 of
the EUROPEA\N CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, CONVENI ION FOR TIE PROTECTION OF IIU'IAN
RIGllS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, the text of th, Convention had been amended according to tlhe
provisions of Protocol No. 3 (ETS No. 45), of Protocol No. 5 (ETS No. 55), and of Protocol No. 8 (LTS No.
118), and comprised also the text of Protocol No. 2 (ETS No. 44) which, in accordance with Article 5,
paragraph 3 thereof, had been an integral part of the Conver,ioa since-its entry into force on 2i September
1970. All provisions which had been amended or added by these Protocols are replaced by t'otocol No. 11
(ETS No. 155), as from the date of its entry into force on 1 November 1998. As from that date, Protocol No.
9 (ETS No. 140), is repealed and Protocol No. 10 (ETS No. 143) hai lost its purpose; Art. 5 of the AFIUCAN
CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES RIGHTS. AFRICAN [BANJUI] CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES'
RIGHTS, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5. 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982). See a do Arts. 16(4) arid 16(5) of the
CONVENTION CONCERNING INDIGENOUS AND TRIBAL PEOI'I ES IN INDEPENDENT COUNIRIES, 28 I.L.M.
1382 (1989); CONVENTION CONCERNING INDIGENOUI AND TRIbAL PEOPLES IN INDEPENDENT
COUNTRIES (ILO No. 169), 72 I.L.O. 59.
4 I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAl. LAw, 403-6 [5T" ed. 1999] [hereinafter
referred to as BROWNLIE1; See Nottebohm case, (Liechtenstein A-. Guatemala) Judgment (Second Phase) I.C.J.
Rep. 4 (1955); Canevaro Case (Italy vs. Peru), 11 RIU\ 397 (1912).
s Neer Claim (US-Mexico General Claims Commission), 4 RIAA 60 (1926).
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threshold of mere espousal of claims by States to allow some measure of individual
presentation of claims. Nevertheless, severe difficulties in various areas of litigation
remain in the vindication of human rights, largely generated by the absence of a
coherent and uniformly applicable system of enforcement and redress for human
rights violations. For as long as individual claimants are dependent upon
international consensus for remedies, there are no real human rights. There are
norms for observance by state and non-state actors, but their obligatory nature can
very well be denied.
This paper assesses human rights remedies from the perspective of the
individual human rights victim. The first section outlines the different forums
(international and local) for redress to which individual victims of human rights
violations may apply, concisely summarizing the salient basic procedures and the
extent of relief that may be afforded in such forums. The second section examines
common issues affecting the recourse of human rights victims to various remedies,
identifying three common 'stasis' points where individual claimants can expect
severe delay or even outright foreclosure of the remedy: 1) jurisdiction of the
forum (including standing to sue and the political question doctrine as applied in
domestic courts), 2) the extent of authority of the forum, and 3) the
enforcement and execution of judgment of the forum. The second section also
posits (as a further consideration for individual claimants) the correlation between
the success of the claim and the severity of the liability or relief sought by the
potential claimant. The third section will illustrate the principles analyzed in the
second section through the extreme case of the 'Jugun Ianfu' (Comfort Women) of
World War II, and discuss possible remedies available to this class of claimants.
The last section briefly concludes with prospects for the international human rights
remedies system.
Finally, it hardly needs stating that it is not the intent of this paper to
impugn the relevance of human rights discourse, but merely to substantiate its
significance to the direct victims of human rights violations by identifying the
lacunae in enforcement of human rights and positing solutions for controversial
issues under the current remedies system of international law.
I. INSTITUTIONS FOR REDRESS: BASIC PROCEDURES AND RELIEFS
The protection of human rights pervades the entirety of the United
Nations Charter 6, underscoring its importance to the community of nations. The
6 CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 59 Stat. 1031, T.I.A.S. 993 11945] [hereinafter referred to
as U.N. CHARTER].
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preamble to the Charter "reaffirms faith in fundamental human rights, and in the
dignity and worth of the human person". Article 1(3) of the Charter assigns as one
of the basic purposes of the UN the task of "achieving international cooperation
and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms". Article 55
specifically calls on member States to "promote universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction
as to race, sex, language or religion'. In relation to Article 55, Article 56 declares
"all members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation
with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55."
The primacy of human rights as a concern of all States is unequivocally
evident. Curiously enough, however, there is no principle or provision in the
Charter that describes the specific content of any obligation of States to victims of
human rights violations. The tenor of the Charter provisions implies that States are
the principal actors in human rights promotion and observance, and leaves to their
judgment and discretion both the treatment and legal circumstances of individuals
possessing such rights.
Given this framework, it is altogether understandable that victims of
human rights violations to date have limited access to different forums for redress.
Each forum is distinct in mandate and function, and the extent of relief that victims
can obtain from each is predictably diverse. The following subsections outline
salient basic procedures, issues, and limitations unique to each forum, still from the
perspective of the individual victims seeking relief.
A. INTERNATIONAL ORGANS/TRIBUNALS
1. The International Court of Justice (ICJ)
As the international tribunal succeeding to the Permanent Court of
International Justice (PCIJ), the ICJ continues to reify States as the only parties
entitled to bring cases before it.7 The ICJ exercises both advisory8 and contentious9
jurisdiction. It is in the latter type of jurisdiction that individual victims of human
rights violations will be principally concerned.
7 STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE [hereinafter referred to as I.C.J.
STATUTE] art. 34, para. 1.
8 Art. 65(1) of the I.C.J. STATUTE provides that the Court can render an advisory opinion "on any
legal question at the request of whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations to make such a request."
9 See I.C.J. STATUTE, arts. 34-36.
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Necessarily, the litigation of the claims of individual victims is dependent
upon the ability of a State to validly assert their rights against a violating State to
whom the offending acts are attributed.10 Individual claims must be adopted by a
State. However, the process of 'adoption', or the establishment of a juridical link
between the individual and the State, is hardly automatic. Customary norms have
developed in ascertaining the 'valid bases' for a State to elevate individual claims to
the international plane.
The less controversial among these bases is the principle of 'nationality of
claims' (alternatively known as the principle of diplomatic protection" or the
doctrine of espousal of claims), which permits a State of nationality of the injured
victim to sue the violating State. The rationale for the principle is that a State
causing injury to an individual indirectly injures the State of nationality. The
adoption of the claim does not undermine the separate interest of the State of
nationality --- ultimately, what will be litigated in theory is the injury to the State as
inflicted on its nationals.'2  Moreover, the discreton employed by the State of
nationality to take up the claim of an individual is still considered as part of its
reserved domain of domestic jurisdiction. 13
The application of the nationality of claims principle is not without its
complications. In the Nottebohm case,1 4 the Court laid down the clarification that it
is the effective nationality of the individual that creates a substantial legal interest for
the State seeking to exercise diplomatic protection. Where the individual has dual
nationality, Article 4 of the 1930 Hague Convention strictly prohibits any of the
States from which the individual derives nationality from exercising diplomatic
protection against the other.'5
However, where the individual does not possess the necessary ties of
nationality with the State seeking to assert diplomatic protection, the rules for
recognition of standing in the Court are less clear. The strict view holds that States
cannot exercise any diplomatic protection where there is no link of nationality.16
10 See Arts. 1 and 2 of the ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY, G.A. Res. 56/83, U.N. GAOR,
560, Session, Agenda Item 62.
11 The Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway case, P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) no. 76 (1939).
12 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case, P.C.l.J. (ser. A) no. 2 at 12 (1924).
13 BROWNLIE, p. 293. See also Advisory Opinion on Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and
Morocco Case, P.C.I.J. (ser. B) no. 4 (1923).
14 Nottebohm case, (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) (Second Phase) Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 4. (1955).1 See CONVENTION ON CERTAIN QUESTIONs RELATING TO CONFLICT OF NATIONALITY LAWS,
12 April 1930, SPECIAL PROTOCOL ON STATELESSNESS, 12 April 1930.
16 J. Blackman, State Successions and Statelessness: The Emerging Right to An Effective
Nationality under International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 1161 (1998).
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The more liberal view as regards stateless persons holds that ties of residence, and not
nationality exclusively, are sufficient:
The tendency to assimilate de facto stateless persons (i.e. persons who do
not enjoy the protection of the Government of the State of their nationality
and who have, as refugees, severed their ties with that State) to de jure
stateless persons is further evidence of the importance of the question
whether the nationality which an individual possesses in law is effective.
More and more frequenty, in States in which personal status is, in princile, governed ly
the law of the county of nationality, the personal status of such persons is determined
by the law of their country of residence, rather than by the law of their State of
nationaity, and they are treatea as regards certain rights, not according to ther formal
national status but in the same manner as nationals of the country of their residence.17
(Italics supplied.)
This dispute between the two views has not yet been resolved. The Court
has not had occasion to rule upon norms concerning statelessness in toto.
The issue of state succession has diverse consequences for the status of
nationality. For some publicists, nationals of the predecessor State do not acquire
the nationality of the successor State.'8 The International Law Commission posits
the opposing view that the successor State may grant nationality to persons having
habitual residence in their territory, thus including nationals of the predecessor
State.19 Again, the Court has not ruled upon this issue, thereby permitting a fertile
academic debate on the use of habitual residence as an acceptable substitute for the
nationality link.
Where the basis for the State to sue is other than the juridical ties of
nationality or habitual residence, the State expectedly faces difficulty meeting locus
standi requirements for the Court to take jurisdiction. In the South WestAfrica cases2 °
the Court denied the existence of direct legal interests on the part of Ethiopia and
Liberia (both of whom applied with the Court for relief in behalf of many
individuals residing in South Africa allegedly subject to maltreatment and abuse
from the apartheid policies of the South African government) as would satisfy locus
17 WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 197 (1956).
18 WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 143-144 (2d. ed., 1979);
See Beemelmans, State Succession in International Law. Remarks on Recent Theory and State Practise, 15 B.U. INT'L.
L.J. 71 (1997).
19 Draft Articles on Nationality, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its
4 7d, Session, arts. 19 and 20. <http://un-org/law/lc/reports/1997/chap-4.html>
20 South West Africa cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa, Liberia v. South Africa) (Preliminary
Objections), I.C.J. Reports 319 (1962). See Northern Cameroons case, I.C.J. Reports (1963).
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standi. The narrow majority of the Court in the second phase of the proceedings
(1966) treated the issue of legal interest as one of merits:
The Court simply holds that such rights or interest, in order to exist, must be
clearly vested in those who claim them, by some text or instrument, or rule
of law.
The Court ruled against Ethiopia and Liberia, relying upon provisions of
the Mandate for South West Africa stipulating that only Members of the League of
Nations could submit a dispute with the Mandatory to the PCIJ. Neither Ethiopia
nor Liberia was a member at the time of the dispute. The Court significantly stated:
... the argument amounts to a plea that the Court should allow the equivalent
of an 'actiopopulari4s or right resident in any member of a community to take
legal action in vindication of a public interest.... Although a right of this kind
may be known to certain municipal systems of law, it is not known to
international aw as it stands atpresent.. 21
The State would have to rely upon a wider legal construct to invoke a
sufficient legal interest as would entitle it to sue before the Court.
Various such 'constructs' have arisen in academic debate to grant third
States (by this we refer to States possessing neither nationality nor residence links
with the individuals injured by the violations of another State s) the sufficient legal
interest to sue before the Court: obligations erga omnes, denial ofjustice, violation ofjus
cogens norms, among others. While the Court has had the opportunity to define and
illustrate the principles involved in the latter,22 the acceptability of such bases for
States to acquire locus standi has never been tested in the Court. It must be further
observed that the common denominator among these bases is the correlation
posited by the State between the nature of the norm violated and the existence of legal
interest by the State. Unlike the traditional bases of nationality and residence, which
confers upon the State the right of action the individual would have against a State
21 South West Africa cases (Second Phase), I.C.J. Reports 47 (1966).
22 For obligations erga omnes and peremptory norms/jus cogens norms, see Barcelona Traction
Case (Belgium vs. Spain) (Second Phase), I.C.J. Reports, paras. 33-34 (1970); Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua vs. U.S.) (Merits), I.C.J. Reports, para. 190 (1986); South West
Africa cases (Second Phase), I.C.J. Reports, 304 (1966); East Timor case, I.C.J. Reports, 90 at 102 (1995);
Reservations on the Convention on Genocide (Advisory Opinion) I.C.J. Rep. 15 (1951); Case Concerning the
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), L.C.J. Reports, para. 31 (1996); See also R. Higgins, Derogation Under Human Rights
Treaties, 1976-77 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L. L. 281-82. See also K. Parker. Jus Cogens: "Compelhng The Law of Human
Rigbhs, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L LEv. 2, 454 (1989); L. HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1988); N. JORGENSEN, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONAL
CRIMtEs, 93-95 (2000).
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or its agents, obligations erga omnes, denial ofjustice, and violation ofjus cogens norms stretch
the concept of derivative injury to the State. Under the latter bases, any State would
allegedly possess 'sufficient' legal interest by virtue of the content of the norm
violated by another State. The political status of the individual recipients of the
injury becomes altogether irrelevant because all States, in theory, are injured by the
violation of the norm in question. In the famous obiter dictum in the Barcelona
Traction case the Court pronounced thus:
In particular, an essential distinction should be drawn between the
obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and
those arising vis-i-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By
their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In view of the
importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal
interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes...
Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law,
from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the
principles and rules concerning basic rights of tl~e human person including
protection from slavery and racial discrimination. Some of the
corresponding rights of protection have entered into the body of general
international law; others are conferred by international instruments of a
universal or quasi-universal character. 23
Notably, the International Law Commission as well as some publicists
interprets the afore-cited passages to favor the creation of a legal interest sufficient
to entitle States to assert locus standi.24
It is manifest, therefore, that individual victims would have to hurdle their
own national laws and procedures for the adoption of their claims by their State
before the Court, as well as both the nascent and established norms in international
law for their States to acquire locus standi. However, should the individual victims
prove successful in both instances, the reliefs (whether restitution, damages, specific
performance, satisfaction, injunctive relief) that may be granted will not
automatically accrue to them, as it is the applicant State who prosecutes the case
and is awarded the reliefs prayed for. The reliefs prayed for by the applicant State
may not necessarily be those of the individual victims, and even when they are, the
applicant State is under no express international obligation to transmit such reliefs
(such as damages) to the individual victims. 2 5 If it does transmit such reliefs to the
23 Barcelona Traction Case (Belgium vs. Spain) (Second Phase) I.C.J. Reports paras. 33-34 (1970).
24 ILC Yearbook (1976), vol. 2, pt. 2, 99; M. RAGAZZI, THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL
OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES, 203 (1997); T. MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW-MAKING IN THE UNITED
NATIONS 195-6 (1986).
2 C. Gray, Is there an International Law of Remedies? 65 BRIT. YB INT'L L. 25, 36 (1985).
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individual victims, neither is there any express international obligation that governs
the manner of disposition and distribution to individual victims.26
A final consideration that individual victims must take into account (apart
from the national laws governing adoption of their claim by the plaintiff State, the
fulfillment of locus standi requirements in the Court, the extent of reliefs that may be
granted and the possibility of transmission to the individual victims ) in availing of
the Court as its chosen forum for redress is the extent of its contentious
jurisdiction. Since the Court may only adjudicate disputes between States that have
consented to its jurisdiction,27 such consent is obtainable only by agreement with
respect to a particular dispute,28 a treaty provision by which States parties agree to
submit disputes arising under the treaty to the Court,29 or through an "optional
clause" declaration prospectively recognizing the Court's jurisdiction.30
Individual victims must not only ensure that the applicant State asserting their
claims is embraced by the jurisdiction of the Court; more importantly, the
respondent State from which they seek to obtain relief must consent to the suit.
2. International Labor Organization (ILO)
The ILO monitors conformity by States Parties with norms under various
ILO Conventions. Articles 24-34 of the ILO Constitution contain the basic
procedures for facilitation of complaints and grievances. Article 24 of the ILO
Constitution permits any "industrial association of employers or workers" to make
a representation to the ILO that a State Party has "failed to secure in any respect
the effective observance within its jurisdiction of any Convention to which it is a
party." The ILO Governing Body may communicate such a representation to the
government of the State Party in question and invite the latter to reply. If no reply
is given, or such reply is unsatisfactory to the ILO Governing Body, then the ILO
has the right to publish the representation made along with the reply statement,
if any, presented.3 1
Under Article 26 of the ILO Constitution, governments of State Parties
may also raise complaints for non-observance of any ILO Convention ratified by
both the complainant State and the respondent State. The ILO Governing Body
may opt to communicate the complaint to the government of the State in question,
D. SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 54-55 [2000] [hereinfater
referred to as SHELTON].
27 I.C.J. STATUTE, arts. 34-36.
28 I.C.J. STATUTE, art. 36(1).
29 l.C.J. STATUTE, art. 40(1).
0 LC.J. STATUTE, art. 36(2).
31 I.L.O. CONSTITUTION, art. 25 <http://www.ilo.org/public/enghish/about/iloconst.htm#a24>
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and follow the procedure earlier stated under Article 24. Otherwise, the ILO
Governing Body may create a Commission of Inquiry to consider the complaint
and render a report after a quasi-judicial proceeding to which the States Parties
involved will be given the opportunity to participate.32 In its report, the
Commission presents recommendations to be implemented within a specified
time.33 The Director General of the ILO shall then communicate the Commission
report to the ILO Governing Body. The governments involved shall inform the
Director General if they accept the recommendations contained in the Commission
report, and if not, whether they propose to refer the complaint to the International
Court of Justice (ICJ).34 The ICJ may then affirm, reverse, or vary the
recommendations of the Commission report. If any State Party fails to carry out
the recommendations of the Commission, or the decision of the ICJ, then "the
Governing Body may recommend to the Conference such action as it may deem
wise and expedient to secure compliance therewith. '35
3. United Nations Charter Organs
a. UN High Commission for Human Rights (UNHCR)
The UNHCR aims to ensure the practical implementation of universally
recognized human rights norms through treaty monitoring, fact-gathering and
fact-finding activities, engaging in diplomatic dialogue with Governments on
human rights issues, providing advisory and technical assistance upon request,
and publishing reports on the status of observance of human rights standards
throughout the globe. 36 Treaty implementation is monitored through reports
submitted by State Parties every two to five years. Fact-gathering is undertaken
through information sent to the UNHCR from reliable media sources, UNHCR
regional offices and advisers, field offices, and other institutional partners in the UN
system. Fact-finding by the High Commissioner may take any of the following
forms: (a) visit by the High Commissioner, (b) Despatch of an Envoy, (c)
Despatch of a Fact-Finding mission or (d) Information gathering by field offices of
the UNHCR.
32 I.L.O. CONSTITUTION, art. 26 <http://www.iao.org/public/enghish/about/iloconst.htm#a24>
33 I.L.O. CONSTITUTION, art. 28 <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/iloconst.htm#a24>
34 I.LO. CONSTITUTION, art. 29 < http://www.lo.org/publc/enghsh/about/aoconst.htm#a24>
35 I.L.O. CONsTrunON, art. 33 <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/iloconst.htm#a24>
36 B. Ramcharan, The United Nations High Comissionerfor Human Righis: The Chalenges offInternational
Protection, 71 INT'L STUD. HUM. RTS. 2002; see also U.N. G.A. Res. 48/141, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/141
(1994), providing for the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR).
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The protective role and functions of the UNHCR have evolved to include
the development of an early warning mechanism (a 24-hour 'hotline' 37 for
reporting human rights violations available to victims, their relatives, or non-
governmental organizations and a Human Rights Data Base for investigating
human rights situations), conflict prevention strategies (sending international
observers or fact-finders, mediation by eminent persons who can offer good offices
to help defuse situations where gross violations of human rights appear imminent,
extensive reporting with the Security Council, among others), and public
statements on individual cases. 38
The extent of relief that may be afforded to individual victims under the
UNHCR processes earlier stated is conceivably limited:
"Fact-finding in the field of human rights has a special importance, and also
encounters special difficulties, both because of the subject-matter and
because of the importance attached to it by public opinion, which regards it
as the acid test of the effectiveness of international organizations... It is
however all the more difficult, because it frequently concerns the action and
essential interests, if not indeed the very structure, of the States involved,
who are therefore less inclined to accept international intervention in such
matters.... One conclusion to be drawn from this is that is necessary to have
available a variey of procedures suited to different situations, ranging from quasijudicial
inquiries to methods involving a minimum offormafiy such as 'direct contacts'.
b. United Nations General Assembly (GA)
The GA has the authority to issue resolutions or recommendations on any
matter within the scope of the Charter.40 It may also authorize the creation of
Working Groups or other ad-hoc committees to undertake factual findings or
studies of human rights situations. The resolutions in themselves are not legally
binding, and are merely reflective of the opinions of the Member States of the
United Nations.
37 U.N. Press Release HR/94/20, 30 May 1994. The hotline number is +41-22-917-0092
3 Report to the Commission on Human Rights on the Situation in Rwanda, U.N. Press Release
HR/95/19 (1994).
19 B.G. RAMCHARAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FACT-FINDING IN THE FIELD OF HuMAN
RIGHTS vii (1982). See also The Be~rade Minimum Ru/is of Proadur for International Hman Righis Fac-fltding
Mitsions, 75 Am. J. Int'l. L 163 (1981).
40 U.N. CHARTER, arts. 10-11.
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c. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
The Economic and Social Council coordinates the work of the fourteen
UN specialized agencies, ten functional commissions and five regional
commissions; receives reports from eleven UN funds and programmes and issues
policy recommendations to the UN system and to Member States.41 Some of these
commissions include the Commission on Human Rights, Commission on the Status
of Women, and the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights. The Commissions traditionally exercise research and fact-finding powers
and provide technical support to covered groups (i.e. NGOs for women or
minorities), with limited authority to issue potentially sensitive annual country
reports.
d. Office of the UN Secretary General
As the chief administrative officer of the UN, the Secretary General may
exercise good offices to protect human rights. He/She exerts moral persuasion
with Member governments by calling their attention to a particular human rights
situation or mediating upon request in such situations.42
e. UN Security Council
The Security Council has the mandate, under Chapter VII of the Charter
of the United Nations, to achieve the "pacific settlement of any dispute, the
continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace
and security." It may call on States to apply sanctions (Article 41 measures) or take
such military action "necessary to restore international peace and security" (Article
42 measures). It may make "regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement
action under its authority" (Article 53 measures), and may also create specialized
tribunals for the prosecution of international crimes in conflict-ridden regions, as
seen in the international criminal tribunals for Rwanda (ICTR) and the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY). It is highly unlikely that individual victims may course
complaints before the Council, although the Council has at times acted upon the
41 For a complete list of the sub-organizations, see <http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ecosoc
/about.htm> See also Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Resolution 1503 (XLVIII) 1970,
establishing the procedure for the Council's examination of communications on "situations that appear to
reveal a consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations of human rights requiring consideration by
the Commission" and ECOSOC Resolution 1235 ECOSOC Resolution 1235 (XLII) 1967, which establishes
the procedure for the Council to conduct an annual public debate and issue country-specific reports focusing
on gross violations of human rights.
42 See K. Annan, The Question fIntervention: Statements by the SecartaT-.General, U.N. DPI/2080 - 10 M
- December 1999.
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instance of international media reports as well as the reports of Special Rapporteurs
designated by it to conduct fact-finding missions. 43
B. Treaty-Based Enforcement
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and
Subsequent Protocols
Part IV of the ICCPR creates the Human Rights Committee, which
monitors and reviews the reports of State Parties on the implementation and
compliance with the ICCPR.44 States Parties may bring written communications to
other States Parties when it deems that such Party/ies is/are "not giving effect to
the ICCPR". If there is no resolution within 6 months, the State bringing the
communication may refer the matter to the Committee, who will submit a report
within 12 months containing a statement of facts and the resolution reached by the
Parties, or recommended actions to remedy the viobtion. (Recommended actions
have included public fact-finding investigations, criminal prosecution,
compensation, ensuring non-repetition of the violation, amending the law,
restitution, among others.45) If the Parties do not reach a resolution, the
Committee may create an ad hoc Conciliation Commission acceptable to both
Parties to arrive at an amicable solution. The Commission will submit a report
within 12 months. Parties must then notify the Committee whether or not they
accept the contents of the Commission report.
Under Article 40(4) of the ICCPR, the Committee may also issue "general
comments as it may consider appropriate to the States Parties", involving the rights
and duties contained in the ICCPR. It submits an annual report to the UN General
Assembly.
Significantly, the First Optional ProtocolW6 to the ICCPR permits
individuals claiming to be victims of human rights violations under the ICCPR to
submit written communications to the Committee, after having exhausted all
available domestic remedies (which does not include 'unreasonably prolonged'
domestic remedies). Anonymous communications are inadmissible. After receiving
the communication, the Committee refers the same to the State Party in question
43 L. SOHN, INTERPRETING THE LAW, in UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER (1995).
44 Articles 28-45 of the INTERNATIONAL COVENANT FOR CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, G.A.
Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16 at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
45 SHELTON, 142-3.
46 OPTIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
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for the latter's reply, explanation, clarification, or remedy within 6 months from
receipt of communication by the State Party in question.
The Second Optional Protoco 4 7 provides the same communication and
reporting procedures under the ICCPR (for States Parties) and the First Optional
Protocol (for individuals) in respect to the particular obligation of the State Party
"to take all necessary measures to abolish the death penalty within its jurisdiction"
and to uphold that "no one within the jurisdiction of a State Party to the present
Protocol shall be executed." The Second Optional Protocol does not permit
reservations, except for reservations in respect to the application of the death
penalty "in time of war pursuant to a conviction for a most serious crime of a
military nature committed during wartime."
2. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (Torture Convention)
Among several obligations contained in Part I of the Torture
Convention48, States Parties have the specific obligations to prohibit any act of
torture; to take all administrative, legislative, and judicial measures to prevent all
acts of torture within their jurisdiction; to deny extradition of individuals to States
where there are substantial grounds (including a consistent pattern of gross
violations of human rights) to believe they would be tortured; provide the individual
victim of torture with a forum for redress and an enforceable right to fair and
adequate compensation. Part II of the same Convention creates the Committee
Against Torture, to whom regular 4-year reports on the implementation and
compliance with the Convention by States Parties are submitted. The Committee
considers such reports, and may issue "general comments" to the State Party
concerned, which may or may not be included in the Committee's annual report to
the United Nations. 49 The Committee may receive information from any source on
allegations of torture, and if these are well-founded, the Committee invites the State
Party concerned to cooperate in the examination of the information and to submit
its observations. The Committee may also undertake a confidential inquiry
(including visits to the territory concerned) if warranted.50
Similar to the ICCPR procedures, under the Article 21 complaints
procedure in the Torture Convention, the Committee may also receive written
- SECOND OPTIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, G.A. res. 44/128, annex, U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 49) at 207, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989).
45 TORTURE CONVENTION.
49 TORTURE CONVENTION, art. 19(3) and 19(4).
11 TORTURE CONVENTION, art. 20
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communications from States Parties that "another State Party is not giving effect to
the provisions of the Convention". The alleged non-complying State is given 3
months to reply, and if the matter is not "adjusted to the satisfaction of both States
Parties" within 6 months, the matter may be referred to the Committee. The
Committee examines the communications in closed-door sessions and makes its
good offices available (including the formation of an ad hoc conciliation
commission) to arrive at a "friendly solution of the matter on the basis of respect
for obligations provided in the Convention". Within 12 months, the Committee
issues a report stating the facts and the solution reached by the States Parties, if any.
Article 22 of the Convention expressly extends analogous procedures
under Article 21 to communications made by individuals. (Again, no anonymous
complaints are admissible and all domestic remedies must be exhausted, not
including those that are "unreasonably prolonged or unlikely to bring effective relief
to the person.") The receiving State must give a reply within 6 months from receipt
of the communication from the Committee. The Committee thereafter renders a
report similar to that required under Article 21.
3. The 1949 Geneva Conventions and Subsequent Protocols l
The 1949 Geneva Conventions are to be applied "with the cooperation
and. under the scrutiny of the Protecting Power whose duty it is to safeguard the
interests of the Parties to the conflict. '5 2 Protecting Powers aid in the facilitation of
mediation and aid consistent with the standards set by the Conventions. Under
Articles 9 and 10 of the Conventions, where no Protecting Powers are functioning,
the contracting parties may agree to entrust the duties incumbent on Protecting
Powers to an "organization that offers all guarantees of impartiality and efficacy."
51 GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED
AND SICK IN THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, (hereinafter referred to as GENEVA
CONVENTION 1); GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF WOUNDED,
SICK AND SHIPWRECKED MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AT SEA, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, (hereinafter referred to
as GENEVA CONVENTION II); GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF
WAR, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, (hereinafter referred to as GENEVA CONVENTION III), GENEVA CONVENTION
RELATIVE THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIMES OF WAR, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, (hereinafter referred
to as GENEVA CONVENTION IV); PROTOCOL I ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF AUGUST
12, 1949, AND RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS, UN
Doc. A/32/144 Annex I, 1125 U.N.T.S. 17512, (hereinafter referred to as PROTOCOL I); PROTOCOL II
ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF AUGUST 12, 1949, AND RELATING TO THE PROTECTION
OF VICTIMS OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS, UN Doc. A/32/144 Annex II, 1125 U.N.T.S.
17513, (hereinafter referred to as PROTOCOL II).
52 Article 8 of the GENEVA CONVENTIONS 1-111, and art. 9 of the GENEVA CONVENTION IV.
See also F. KALSHOVEN AND L. ZEGVELD, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR: AN INTRODUCTION
TO INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2001).
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The organization usually designated is the International Committee of the Red
Cross/Crescent (ICRC) or any other impartial humanitarian organization.
The Conventions permit Parties to the conflict to undertake bilateral
inquiries regarding allegations of human rights violations and specifically on grave
breaches of the Convention, 3 to search for and bring before its courts or to
hand over to another High Contracting Party according to its own legislation
persons alleged to have committed such grave breaches.5 4 Other devices that may
be relied upon are meetings between High Contracting Parties, inter-agency
cooperation with the United Nations, and closed-door inquiries by organizations
such as the ICRC.
Article 90 of Protocol I authorizes the creation of an International Fact-
Finding Commission for the purpose of inquiry into alleged grave breaches of the
Conventions or the Protocol, facilitation through good offices of restoration of
"attitudes of respect" for the Conventions and Protocol I, and inquiry upon request
of a Party to the conflict with the consent of other Parties to the conflict. The
inquiry partakes of a quasi-judicial proceeding where all States Parties involved are
permitted to present evidence. The Commission may not publish its findings unless
it has the unanimous consent of all States Parties to the conflict. Unfortunately for
individual victims of rights violations in non-international armed conflict, Protocol
II does not establish any similar procedure for inquiry into alleged grave breaches
by individual combatants.
The Geneva Conventions and its Protocols do not establish any coherent
complaints procedure that may be availed of by individual victims of human rights
violations in the context of armed conflict. At best, individuals may resort to
personal appeals to the Protecting Power or the international organization acting as
such. Otherwise, they must course their complaints to their own governments
53 Grave breaches of the Conventions include: willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment,
willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health (embraced by GENEVA CONVENTIONS I-
IV); extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out
unlawfully and wantonly (embraced by GENEVA CONVENTIONS I, II, AND IV); compelling a prisoner of war
or a civilian to serve in the forces of the hostile power, willfully depriving a prisoner of war or protected
person of the rights of a fair and regular trial (embraced by GENEVA CONVENTIONS III AND IV); unlawful
deportation or transfer of a protected person, unlawful confinement of a protected person, and taking of
hostages (embraced by GENEVA CONVENTION IV). See S. RATNER ANDJ. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW [2M ed. 2001] [hereinafter referred to as RATNER AND
ABRAMSI.
54 Art. 49 of GENEVA CONVENTION I; are. 50 of GENEVA CONVENTION II; art. 129 of GENEVA
CONVENTION III; art. 146, GENEVA CONVENTION IV; See also Common Art. 3 of the GENEVA
CONVENTIONS.
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(who are presumably parties to the conflict). There is no guarantee of individual
reliefs that may be obtained.
C. Local (Domestic/Regional Institutions)
1. United States Courts under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) and
Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA)
The Alien Tort Claims Act was adopted in 1789 as part of the Judiciary
Act of the United States. The text of the law reads, in its entirety: "The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort
[personal injury] only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States."5 5 Much of the interpretation of the ATCA lies with recent
jurisprudence, specifically involving human rights cases.56 In the landmark Filartiga
case, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the ATCA allows victims to sue
in US courts for serious violations of international human rights law. The Court
held:
...We believe it is sufficient here to construe the Alien Tort Statute, not as
granting new rights to aliens, but simply as opening the federal courts for
adjudication of the rights already recognized by international law... It is only
where the nations of the world have demonstrated that the wrong is of
mutual, and not merely several, concern, by means of express international accords,
that a wrong genera4 recognized becomes an international law violation wthin the
meaning of the Statute.5 7 (Italics supplied.)
The Court went on to state that the ATCA provides for both jurisdiction for
district courts and cause of action for violations of the law of nations.58
Recent cases have clarified the issue of "choice of law" for district courts
faced with cases filed under the ATCA. In Tachiona v. Mugabe, the court affirmed
that international law could be used as the substantive basis for the evaluation of
the case on the merits, and not merely the municipal law of the plaintiffs nor the
municipal laws of the United States:
5s 28 U.S.C. 5 1350.
56 See among others Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 & n. 21 (2d Cir. 1980) (conviction of
Panama's chief of police for acts of torture); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (l1th Cir. 1996) (alleging
torture of Ethiopian prisoners); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (alleging torture, rape, and other
abuses orchestrated by Serbian military leader); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir.
1994) (alleging torture and other abuses by former President of Philippinep); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C.Cir. 1984) (alleging claims against Libya based on armed attack upon civilian bus
in Israel).
57 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 & n. 21 (2d Cir. 1980).
58 Id. at 584.
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[V]arious international declarations, covenants and resolutions catalogue
rights all persons should enjoy; affirm the obligations of nations to ensure
those rights by means of implementing legislation... It is unlikely to escape
the notice of government leaders who defile the powers of their offices by
resorting to the barbarism of state-sponsored torture and murder, and to the
brutalities characteristic of inhuman treatment of their nation's own people,
to equally dishonor the municipal justice gystem and its laws in order to immunite
themselves from accountabifity and labifiy for their wrongs. .... Because customary
international norms are not always fixed in codifications and treaties, not evey
nation will necessari# reflect ckar in its domesticjurisprudence prncipks that manifest its
unequivocal assent and adherence to universal stadards that may override municipal
ruks.59
Despite the liberal nature of the ATCA, its applicability for all cases of
international human rights victims is not a crystalline matter. While the ATCA
permits individual litigants to seek civil liability for human fights violations
committed by individuals, it does not necessarily extend, without qualification,
coverage to sovereign States. In this regard, the ATCA must be read in conjunction
with the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA),6° which prohibits US courts
from exercising jurisdiction over sovereign States except in four instances: (1)
Cases involving commercial activity, such as contracts involving the purchase of
goods; (2) Cases involving noncommercial torts, like car accidents; (3) Cases
where there are explicit and implicit waivers of immunity by the sovereign State
being sued; (4) If the suit involves property located in the United States. Any
individual litigant seeking to bring suit against a sovereign State under the ATCA
must invoke any of the four exceptions under the FSIA.6 1
A later enactment by the US Congress that may aid in the institution of
civil suits concerning violations of human rights is the 1992 Torture Victim
Protection Act (TVPA).62 The Act authorizes plaintiffs to sue any individual who
tortured or summarily executed another person, such individual acting under color
of, actual or apparent authority in a foreign nation. Plaintiffs must have
exhausted remedies in the country where the conduct giving rise to the claim
occurred. The TVPA has a 10-year prescriptive period for filing suits.
59 Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp.2d 259 at 414-5 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). See also Xuncax v. Gramajo,
886 F. supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995); J. Prociv, Incorporating Specific International Standards Into ATCA Jurijprudence:
Wvhy the Ninth Ciruit SbouldAffirm UNOCAL, 34 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 515, *515.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1330.
61 See W. Heiser, Civil L*igation as a Means of Compensating Victims of International Terrorism, 3 SAN
DIEGO INT'L L. J. 1, 45-46 (2002); J. Murphy, Ctil Liahiky for the Commirsion of Intenational Crimes as an
Alrnative to Criminal Prosecution, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 53-54 (1999).
62 28 U.S.C. S 1350; See RATNER AND ABRAMS 243-5.
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2. European Institutions
a. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
The primary mandate of the OSCE under the 1975 Helsinki Final Act is to
provide for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict
rehabilitation for its 55 member States in Europe. It addresses human rights issues
largely through diplomatic intervention and mediation.63 While it can receive
reports and complaints from individuals on occasion, it does not provide for a
system of enforcement and redress targeted particularly for individual victims of
human rights violations.
b. European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Court of Human Rights
(CHR)
These institutions are often confused with one another. As the supreme
court of the European Union (which the CHR is not), the ECJ may consider issues
of human rights in the European Community. However, individuals cannot bring
cases in the ECJ. The ECJ may only hear cases involving. (1) Claims by the
European Commission that a member State has not implemented a directive or
legal requirement of the EU, or (2) Claims by member States that the European
Commission has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction."4
The CHR, on the other hand, permits both states and individuals to bring
cases against States Parties to the European Convention on Human Rights. 65 It has
jurisdiction to afford remedies to either state or individual plaintiffs following a full
adversarial and public proceeding to prove the existence of a breach of the
Convention. The first stage of the proceedings is generally written (the Court may
hold a public hearing when warranted by the issue of admissibility), involving the
admissibility of the application. During the judicial procedure, parties are not
precluded from entering into a negotiated settlement. Should no settlement be
reached at the conclusion of the trial, the Chamber seised of the case must, by a
majority vote, render a decision, which may be elevated on appeal to the Grand
Chamber. All final judgments of the Court are binding on the respondent States
63 See <http://www.osce.org>
6 See arts. 34 and 40, ESCC, 188 EAEC and 215 EC, 151 EAEC and 178 EC; Francovich v.
Italian Republic, [1990] E.C.R. 1-5357; for a detailed listing of CHR procedure for individual application, see
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/EDocs/HistoricalBackground.htn.>
65 EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL
FREEDOMS, 4 November 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, as amended by Protocol No. 11, 11 May 1994, Europ. T.S.
155 (1994). The Protocol made it compulsory for States to accept the right of individual application.
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concerned. The extent of relief that the Court may grant is limited to "just
satisfaction" as stipulated under Article 50 of the Convention:
If the Court finds that a decision or measure taken by a legal authority or any
other authority of a High Contracting Party is completely or partially in
conflict with the obligations arising from the Convention, and if the internal
law of the saidparty allows ony partial reparation to be made for the consequences
of this decision or measure, the decision of the Court shall, if necessary,
afford just satisfaction to the injured party.
This provision was derived from arbitral awards in inter-state proceedings.
The CHR was not given appellate jurisdiction to invalidate internal laws.
3. Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR)
The IACHR was created under Chapter VII of Part II of the 1969
American Convention on Human Rights.6 6 Only the Inter-American Commission
of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the States Parties to the
Convention may bring cases concerning the interpretation and the application of
the Convention before the IACHR. 67 (Before any case may be brought before the
Court, applicant-plaintiffs must exhaust the communications and complaints
procedures under the Inter-American Commission.) Individuals must seek the
adoption of their claims by their respective governments before any claim can be
elevated to the IACHR. The Court has the full authority to grant different forms of
reliefs: restitution, reparations, compensation, declaratory judgment, injunctive
relief, etc.
4. African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR)
The Commission monitors state compliance with the provisions of the
1986 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.68 Similar to the ICCPR and
Torture Convention Committees, the ACHPR may receive communications from
individuals, non-governmental organizations or other institutions, after having
exhausted local remedies. The ACHPR would then make specific
recommendations to the states concerned.
66 AMERcAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 36 O.A.S.T.S. 1.
67 STATUTE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT ON HUMAN RIGHTS, O.A.S. Res. 448 (IX-0/79),
O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.P/IX.O.2/80, Vol. 1 at 98; See also RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-
AMERIcAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS, 1991, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/III.25 doc.7 at 18 (1992).
"AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5.
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5. Arbitration Commissions
The creation of arbitration commissions depends upon the consent or
agreement of States to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of such entities.
Usually the arbitral tribunals are tripartite, composed of one member nominated by
each party to the dispute and a third member selected under a given procedure.
While states are frequently the plaintiffs and respondents in the tribunal (again,
occasions for exercising diplomatic protection), in few instances individuals could
initiate proceedings based on the governing agreement from which the authority of
the tribunal is derived.69 Examples of such arbitration commissions include the
1794 Jay Treaty creating a mixed commission to settle claims due to neutrality
violations, the US-Mexican Claims Commission in 1923, and the US-Iran Claims
Commission in the 1970s. The arbitral tribunals in practice have wide authority to
grant reparations, damages, and other reliefs as may be agreed upon in the treaties
creating such tribunals.
6. Truth Commissions
Truth commissions are of relatively recent vintage in international law, a
peculiar device that began in Argentina after the Falkland Islands conflict with the
United Kingdom precipitated the Argentinian military's decline in political power.
The commissions have wide investigative capacity, with the authority to receive
information and reports from all named sources, and may publicly conduct
hearings. The reports made by such commissions ultimately become public
documents.70 The commissions recognize social structures and historical tensions
upon which human rights atrocities are predicated, and dispense with criminal
judgment in light of the sensitivity of the issues and details presented before it by
many injured parties. Particularly in cases where social upheavals are imminent or
are in fact taking place, truth commissions have employed the use of amnesty grants
to encourage the admission and revelation of facts before it.
For individual victims of human rights violations, it is the use of amnesty
that frequently impedes any further relief that may be sought by them apart from
the statement of their grievances and injuries before the commission. While truth
commissions may work towards the restoration of national sensibilities and
69 H. STEINER AND P. ASTON, INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT, (2,d ed. 2000).
70 H. STEINER, INTRODUCTION TO TRUTH COMMISSIONS. HARVARD LAW SCHOOL HUMAN
RIGHTS PROGRAM AND WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION, IN TRUTH COMMISSIONS: A COMPARATIVE
ASSESSMENT (1997) at 7. See also Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation
(1993), Vol. 1, p. 23; Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (1985), Vol. 1.
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reconciliation of divided communities, the public perception of the use of the
amnesty as denial of justice may very well undermine the efforts of the
commissions. 71
Publicists draw novel distinctions between types of amnesties that violate
the international law principles of aut dederF autjudicare and the right to an effective
remedy and others that are consistent with the State's reserved domain of domestic
jurisdiction. The former are illustrated by so-called "blanket" or "sweeping"
amnesties (which do away with any form of accountability for the individual
perpetrators or the state machinery, whether administrative, civil, or criminal), and
"conditional" or "defined" amnesties (which are limited in scope and provide for
some measure of accountability that may be availed of by the victims either
simultaneous with the work of the truth commissions or subsequent thereto).72
Academic support (frequently referring to principles stressed in international
treaties and customary international law) has favored the view that national laws
which overwhelmingly and completely expunge criminal and/or civil liability of
agents of a prior regime alleged to have violated basic human rights contravene the
presumption that all grave breaches of basic human rights of individuals must have
a judicial and not a political resolution.73 It has been argued that a new customary
international law norm has emerged, one that prohibits wholesale impunity for
gross violations of human rights and grave international crimes. 74
7. National courts
In theory, individual victims may apply to national courts for the
adjudication of civil and/or criminal liability against perpetrators of human rights
violations. The rules for acquisition of jurisdiction by the national courts vary
according to the laws of each State. Where the respondent to the suit is a State, or a
State agent acting under color of authority or actual authority, courts of such States
are expectedly reluctant to exercise jurisdiction over the case, invoking internal law
provisions on the non-suability of the State without its consent. Moreover, the
71 R_ Slye, The Legitimay of Amnesties Under lntrnaonal Law and General Prinupks of Anglo-Amencan
Law IsA Legtimate Amness Possible? VIRG. J. INTL. L 173, 180-81 (Fall, 2002).
72 W. Burke-White, &framing lmpuniy: Appbing Liberal International Law Theoty to an Anaosis of
Amnesbi Lgsla ion, 42 HARV. INT'L. L J. 467 (2001); P. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commisions, 1974-1994: A
Compwaive Study, 16 HuM. RTS. Q. 1 (1994).
73 B. CHIGARA, AMNESTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: TlE LEGALITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF NATIONAL AMNESTY LAWS (2002).
74 D. Orendicher, Setthng Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Righs Violations of a Prior Regime, 100
YALE L J. 2537 (1991); C. Joyner, Redressing Impunitfor Human Rigbts Violations: The Univesal Declaration and the
Search for Accountability, 26 DENY. J. INT'L. L & POL'Y 591, 613 (1998); M.C. Bassiouni, 'Cires Against
Humanity" The NetdforA Specaifed Convention, 31 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 457,463 (1994).
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court may also deny jurisdiction for lack of significant minimum contacts that
would render the case susceptible to dismissal under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens75, especially where the respondent is not within the territory of the court
before which the case is brought. Further problems that may be foreseeably
encountered by victim-litigants apart from acquisition of jurisdiction include issues
on choice of law (municipal or international law, unless the forum State accepts the
general principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation),
recognition and enforcement of judgment (should the plaintiff obtain a
favorable judgment from a court other than that located in the forum State), and
the applicable procedural law for the litigation of the case.
II. COMMON ISSUES AFFECTING THE RIGHT TO AN EFFECTIVE REMEDY
The preceding section delineated the basic procedures, reliefs, and
limitations in various forums or institutions for redress to which individual victims
of human rights violations may apply. Whatever that choice may be, given the
precise state of international law on remedies and the lack of coherence in the
structure of the international human rights enforcement system, it is submitted that
the claim of the individual victim will result in some level of stasis (by this we refer
at the very least to severe delay in pursuing the remedy, and at its most extreme, the
denial or foreclosure of the remedy) at any of the following points: the
acquisition of jurisdiction by the chosen forum, the extent of the chosen
forum's authority, and the enforcement and execution of the forum's
judgment. It is finally posited that the individual victim's ability to obtain a
specific relief is inversely proportional to the severity of the liability sought against
the respondent. This peculiar correlation is the natural product of inter-state
relations and accommodations made by States.
A. Acquisition of Jurisdiction by the Forum
Individual claimants have to examine the originating charter, treaty, or
convention governing the forum chosen to ascertain at the first instance whether or
not they are permitted to directly avail of proceedings in the forum. If they may
only present their claims upon the sponsorship or adoption of other entities (usually
States, as in the case of the International Court of Justice and the European Court
of Justice), they must consider the specific rules of the adopting or sponsoring
entities that would entitle them to representation before the chosen forum. With
respect to States, a deficiency in fulfilling any of the significant 'preconditions'
71 See K.K. SHELL SEKIYU OSAKA HATSUBAISHO, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
ET AL., G.R. Nos. 90306-07, 30 July 1990, 188 SCRA 145 (1990) ; Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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for individual claimants under the doctrine of diplomatic protection has, in practice,
yielded an unfavorable result (whether simple delay or outright denial of claim) for
the individual claimants:
(1) The issue of the claimants' eligibility under the laws of the
adopting or sponsoring State, which includes the prior
exhaustion of local remedies76 (applicable in cases where
the violation is a breach of both municipal and international
law, or where the violation is a breach of local law and the
subsequent conduct of the State amounts to a denial of
justice);
(2) The procedure for preparation of the international claim
under the laws of the adopting or sponsoring State, which
includes the ability to secure a priori a framework or
agreement with the adopting or sponsoring State as to the
treatment of their causes of action and prayers for relief with
the chosen forum (noting that the State is under no
international obligation to pay any reparation received by it to
the individual claimant actually injured);
(3) The consent of the States involved to the jurisdiction of the
forum court (as in the case with arbitration commissions and
regional courts of human rights) and the manner of
presentation of the international claim to the chosen
forum;
(4) The existence of sufficient contacts between the individual
claimants and the adopting or sponsoring State that would
uphold the exercise of diplomatic protection.77
The completion of the four preconditions earlier stated should also be
accompanied by the recognition of inherent limitations to the filing of individual
claims. Some of the limitations are institutional or structural (where the
procedures under the chosen forum themselves stipulate that non-compliance with
certain conditions will result in inadmissibility of the claim, as in the case of the
Torture Convention Committee or the ICCPR Committee which only receives
communications from named individuals), while others are conventional or
76 See BROWNuE, 496-506; Norwegian Loans case (France v. Norway), I.C.J. Reports (1957), (-
Lauterpacht, sep. op.); ELSI case (US v. Italy), I.C.J. Reports (1989).
77 R. LILLIcH AND G. CHRISTENSON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR PREPARATION AND
PRESENTATION (1962); See also C. SAFFERLUNG, TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
366-379 (2001); G. Sluiter, International Crminal Prowedings and the Proecaion of Human Right, 37 NEW ENG. L
REV. 935, *935; M. DIXON AND R. MCCORQUODALE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW,
422 (41h ed. 2003).
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determined by the terms of the agreement or conformity of the adopting or
sponsoring State to the jurisdiction of the chosen forum. 'Conventional' limitations
include the operation of the 'Calvo clause'78 (where the individual claimant
himself previously agrees not to seek the diplomatic protection of his own state and
submits matters to local jurisdiction), express denial of waivers of immunity
(particularly in the case of respondent States under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act where the United States government, in a Statement of Interest also
affirms that there is no waiver of immunity by the respondent State), and terms for
extinctive prescription of the right to bring a cause of action to a chosen forum,
which are usually indicated in the rules of procedure of the forum and agreed to by
the States involved in the dispute (the only notable exception being the non-
applicability of statutory limitations in cases of war crimes and crimes against
humanity7 9).
In summary, the success of the individual claimant in the admission of his
claim to the jurisdiction of the chosen forum depends upon his satisfactory
fulfillment of the four identified preconditions and the tailoring of his claim
according to either or both the structural or conventional limitations on the
jurisdiction of the chosen forum.
B. Extent of the Chosen Forum's Authority
Even as the individual claimant may seek admission of his claim to the
jurisdiction of the chosen forum, the pursuit of his claim and his prayers for certain
types of relief will inevitably be limited by the extent of the chosen forum's
authority. If the claimant simply submits his claim (or complaint) to institutions
undertaking fact-finding missions and monitoring (such as the UNCHR or truth
commissions), he cannot expect any relief particularized to him because such
institutions tend to issue recommendations to the States concerned. The
recommendations are non-obligatory in nature and are, in practice, observed by
States only to the minimum behavior that satisfies international comity.80 At best,
the individual claimant can only expect a unilateral change in State policy or
71 North \merican Dredging Co. claim, 4 RIAA 26 (1926); C. CALVo, DEIUCIIO
INEIL.-\CIONAL TORICO Y PitACICO DE EUROPA Y A\IERICA (1868). The clause has been frequently
used in concession contracts, but the original text of Calvo's book does not preclude its use for other types of
international claims.
71 U.N. CONVENTION ON THE NON-APPI.ICABILITY Oi STATUTORN, LIMIITATIONS To WAR
CRIMES AND CimtES AGAINST HUNINlfl', G.A. Res. 2391 (XXIII), annex, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 18 at
40, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968).See Federation Nationale des Deportes et Internes Resistants ct Patriotes and
Others v. Barbie, reprinted in 78 I.LR. 125. It declared that the non-applicability of the statutory limitations
to crimes against humanity and war crimes is already part of customary international law.
s' See T. Buerghenthal, The Normalire and InsliluionalEmIulion of Internaional Human Rights, 19 HUN.
R. Q. 703-723 (1997).
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behavior but only if there is massive international reportage of the findings of the
institution, projecting a derogatory public image of the State concerned, affecting
the conduct of a State's international relations (or the pursuit of its strategic
interests) that would impel it to take action to 'disprove' such an image.8'
If the individual claimant seeks particularized reliefs through full-dress
judicial proceedings in the chosen forum (such as in the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights), the success of his claim
against State agents depends not only upon proof that the internationally wrongful
acts may be attributed to the State involved but also upon several 'extraneous
factors': (1) the preservation of the evidence; (2) compliance with the
modalities of judicial procedure of the chosen forum; (3) the ability to
overcome the political question doctrine when applicable, and (4) the standard
of evidence required by the chosen forum to grant the plaintiff's claim. Each
factor will necessarily be adjusted according to the level of accountability sought by
the individual claimant against State agents: whether administrative, civil, or
criminal, or a combination of any of them.
The first 'extraneous' factor (preservation of the evidence) has found fair
application in cases brought before the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. In most of
these cases, evidence presented by the prosecution was testimonial in character,
with witnesses given considerable latitude during examinations-in-chief to answer
leading questions or even make hearsay statements, without objections from
opposing counsel.82 Judges in these courts were more flexible, unbound by strict
rules in their consideration of questions in order to uphold the interests of justice,
or to speed up the proceedings. 83 Such courts recognized other forms of evidence
would usually be destroyed due to the pervasive nature of the regional conflict, and
that the best evidence obtainable as to the atrocities committed would be from the
victims themselves. (The sole exceptions to this tendency were the Nuremberg
trials, where the widespread atrocities committed by Nazi authorities using German
state machinery were well-documented by the Nazis themselves, as well as testified
to by witnesses.)
81 See STATEMENTS OF COMMENTATORS ON CHINA BEFORE THE UN COMMISSION, IN HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, CHINESE DIPLOMACY, WESTERN HYPOCRISY, AND THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSION, 634-638 (1997).
82 E.g. Prosecutor v. Furundzija (ICTY Case 10 December 1998), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 317
(1999); Rutaganda Judgment, (The .Prosecutor v. Georges Rutaganda, Judgment, ICTR Trial Chamber I, 6
December 1999); Musema Judgment (The Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Judgment, ICTR Trial Chamber I,
27 January 2000).83 A. CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw (2003).
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The second (compliance with the modalities of judicial procedure) and
fourth 'extraneous' factors (standard of evidence) are of little dispute. Individual
claimants should expect a 'stricter' adherence to such modalities (the conduct of
prosecutorial, pre-trial, trial, and appellate proceedings) in criminal judicial
proceedings (as in the ICTY and ICTR, which to a large extent, has also been
replicated in the Statute of the International Criminal Court84) than in civil
proceedings (as in litigation before US courts under the Alien Tort Claims Act or
the Torture Victim Protection Act) or administrative proceedings (usually quasi-
judicial in nature, as in the complaints procedure under the 1949 Geneva
Conventions) Under Art. 69(3) of the Rome Statute (substantially similar to the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the ICTY and ICTR) the standard of evidence
as to admissibility in international criminal proceedings is still "relevance" and
"necessity" 85 While the Rome Statute does not indicate what standard of proof is
sufficient to produce a conviction, actual practice in previous international criminal
proceedings have shown that the standard of "proof beyond reasonable doubt"
may be subsidiarily applied.8 6 On the other hand, civil proceedings in the United
States under the ATCA still apply "preponderance of evidence" as their standard of
proof 87
The third 'extraneous' factor (the political question doctrine) elicits some
considerable burdens for the individual litigant where the chosen forum is a
national court. The use of the political question doctrine operates as a form of
judicial restraint, with courts refusing to rule upon certain issues of the case due to
the existence of a nonjusticiable 'political question'. The doctrine has been justified
by the effect of "international civil adjudication on foreign governmental and
private interests,"88 and has been traditionally employed by national courts in cases
where the respondent is the executive branch of Government of the national court,
particularly in civil liability claims (arising from gross violations of human rights or
tort actions) against States.89 While the doctrine has come under considerable
8' ROME SirxrurE OF THE INTERNATION\LCRININAL COURT, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183 (1988);
RULES OF PROCEDURE AND E.IDENCE FOR THE INTER-NAIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
<http://www.un.org/law/icc/statutc/rulcs/rulefra.htm> ; For sirrular practice in courts exercising universal
crimunal jurisdiction, scc K. Randall, ( rnierfa/jursrdiion I Inder Inlernalional Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785 (1998);
(. Bassiouni, 'nh'erra/Jurndiclion for Inlernalional Crime cI irlormal Perpiectitrs and Conlemporagy Pratice, 42 VIRG.
1. INT'I 1. 82 (2001); l)cmjanjuk v. Pctrovsky, 776 F.2d, 571 (1985); L. Sadat, Redefining U ihrrsalJurisa ion,35
Ni I' G. L,. RE\'. 256 (2001).
" W. SCH\BAS, AN INTRODUCION T1 TIf: INTIiNTIONAL CUMINAL COURT (2001).
" Sec judgment against Schact and von Papen, International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg;
Prosecutor v. Tadic (Case No. IT-94-1-'1), Opinion and judgment, 7 May 1997; Prosecutor v. Akayesu (Case
No. ICTi,-96-4-1),.udgment, 2 September 1998.
17 1 ilao v. Estate of Marcos, No. 95-15779 O.C. No. MDL-00840, 1996.
M' K . Boyd, Are I luman Righls PoliticalQuerlions? 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 281-282 (2001).
I Iwang v. Japan, F.Supp. 172 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D.D.C. 2001); Princz v. Germany, 26 F.3d 1166
(D.C. Cir. 1994), 513 U.S. 1121 (1995); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co. 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999).
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attack in countries with 'liberal' judiciaries, it has not entirely been eliminated to
uphold jurisdiction over human rights claims.
C. Enforcement and Execution of Judgment
Where the chosen forum is a specialized court or tribunal, the execution of
judgment promises to be less cumbersome for the individual claimant.
International criminal tribunals such as the ICTY, the ICTR, and the International
Criminal Court (ICC) often provide for their own procedures for sentencing and
execution of judgment. International 'human rights' courts such as the Court of
Human Rights (in Europe) or the Inter-American Court of Human Rights9° that
permit individual claimants to sue for civil liability arising from human rights
violations, similarly have jurisdiction under their respective Charters or originating
conventions to issue enforcement, seizure or protective orders to expedite the
execution of judgments for individual claimants.
The case is vastly different where the chosen forum is a national court.
Individual claimants who are successful in litigating their civil liability claims against
respondents outside the territorial jurisdiction of the forum court may very well find
themselves with mere *pyrrhic' victories. In the Karadic case, for example, the US
District Court awarded several millions of dollars in damages to the plaintiffs, but
such award has never been enforced due to Karadzic's absence from US territory.91
Where the properties of the respondents are located in another jurisdiction,
traditional conflicts-of-laws rules in the recognition and/or enforcement of foreign
judgments92 will govern.
D. Inverse Proportionality: Specific Relief And Severity of Liability
As seen in the discussion in Part II, individual claimants usually apply more
easily to forums that provide only recommendatory action and factual reportage.
The procedures are simpler, less strenuous, and less financially burdensome on the
part of the individual. (In the ICCPR mechanism, for example, there is no
prescribed or detailed form for the filing of written communications by individuals.)
In contrast, individual claims that involve specific administrative, civil, or criminal
90 For examples of such orders, see Ringeisen v. Austria, (1971) 13 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) and
Ringeisen v. Austria (1972) 15 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A; de Ribemont v. France, (1995), 308 Eur. Ct. H. R.
(ser.A); See also Velasquez Rodriguez case, Inter-An. Ct. H. R. Order of 10 September 1996,
OAS/Ser.L/V/1II.35 Doc. 4 (1997) at 209.
91 Kadic v. Karadzic, (13 October 1995), 70 F.3d 232.
92 See Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, I February 1971 <http://www.legalanguage.com/Hague/haguetx16e.html>; Sec. 4 of
the Uniform Foreign MoneyJudgment Recognition Act of the United States.
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liability require conformity with several preconditions developed by international
practice and custom (as outlined in the preceding sections) tend to create more legal
obstacles for potential individual claimants. There now appears an inverse
proportionality between the individual's success in obtaining a specific relief and the
severity of the liability that he seeks to establish.
The correlation between specific relief and the severity of liability may be
explained by the precise uniqueness of international human rights cases, 93 which
involve State actors whose willingness to submit themselves to another jurisdiction
is variable. Precisely because the international human rights system is a product of
negotiation and not multilateral imposition (there being no 'world court'),94 it is
easier for States to obligate themselves to respect 'actions' which are less 'severe' on
their sovereign interests (such as mere recommendations or fact-finding). Where
the reliefs sought by the individual claimants are more 'severe' on the State or its
nationals (as in the case of damages), States will expectedly demand more
exhaustive procedures before they may be granted.
E. Civil Litigation By Individual Human Rights Victims Against Non-State
Entities
Since Fi/artga v. Pena-Ira/a95 was successfully resolved in favor of the
plaintiffs before a federal court of the United States in 1980, there have been a
significant number of civil cases filed against individuals as well as juridical entities
(particularly corporations) for torts predicated on breaches of international human
rights norms. 96 Civil claimants have made ample use of the Alien Tort Claims Act
and the Torture Victims Protection Act 97 to acquire legal standing within US
jurisdiction and haul alleged perpetrators of human rights violations into US courts.
Publicists have since lauded the use of civil litigation (whether under the
ATCA, TVPA, or in national courts) as an effective tool for human rights victims:
Civil litigation can play an important role in the search for accountability for
human rights violations. Litigation that leads to an enforceable money
judgment offers the plaintiff compensation for the injuries inflicted by the
defendant, punishes those responsible for those harms, and serves as a
deterrent to future abuses. Even if the collection of judgment is impossible,
... many lawsuits lead to judicial recognition of developing rules of law,
93 SHELTON, pp. 47-49.
94 R. HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND Ho\ WE USE IT, 3-5,
107-110 (1999).
15 Id. at note 59.
96 Id. at note 61 and 93.
97 See discussion, pp. 24-26.
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producing a full factual investigation identifying those responsible and
leading to public recognition of the victim's injuries and the defendant's
culpability... Civil remedies play an important role where criminal
prosecution is not possible, and complement criminal prosecutions where
they take place.98
The practice of using civil litigation has not been unique to the United
States. Lawsuits have been filed in several common law legal systems, specifically
challenging human rights violations committed by domestic corporations in their
operations abroad. While framed as 'corporate negligence' claims, they remain
fundamentally human rights violations.99 This practice has been more extensively
utilized in violations of the individual's right to a 'decent, healthy, or viable
environment'1° , whehaer such right is treated as an 'autonomous' human right or as
within the penumbra of the universally-recognized 'right to life'.'0' Transboundary
civil litigation arising from violations of individual environmental rights has also
increased in frequency in recent years. 0 2
As with any other remedy, there are inherent limitations in civil litigation
also apparent in the three 'stasis' points (acquisition of jurisdiction, extent of
forum's authority, enforcement and execution of judgment) earlier enumerated in
this section. Subject matter jurisdiction in cases filed in US courts under the ATCA
and the TVPA are rights under the 'law of nations' and customary international
norms on torture, respectively. For cases filed in national courts, the extent of
subject matter jurisdiction based on international conventional rights or those that
have customary international legal status would depend on the extent of the
application of the doctrine of incorporation in municipal jurisdictions. 0 3 (In the
United Kingdom, for example, courts make an initial choice of law based on the
subject matter of the suit, applying judicial notice in cases involving international
law. Nonetheless, they still have to determine the reasonable parameters within
which the rules of international law will be applied in the municipal sphere.
98 Stephens, Beth. Accountabi&!t Wlithout Hporijy: Consistnt Standards, Honest History, NEW
ENGLAND L. REV. 2002 at 919, 926.
99 Stephens, Beth. lndiriduals Enfordn Innaional w. The C tivZe and Histoical Context. DE
PAUL L R. 2002 at 433.
'0 1989 Hague Declaration on Environment and Development; Article 24 of the African Charter
on Human and Peoples' Rights; Article 12 of the 1966 UN Covenant on Economic and Social Rights; Article
11 of the 1988 Additional Protocol to the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights; 1989 European
Charter on Environment and Health; Article 24(2)(c) of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child; UN
General Assembly Resolution 45/94 (1990).
101 Yanomani Indians v. Brazil, Decision 7615, Inter-American -Commission on Human Rights,
1985, in BIRNIE, PATRICIA and ALAN BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (2-a ed., 2002).
102 Id- at 267-270.
103 BROWNLIE, at 42-47.
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Jurisprudence has tended to incorporate customary law only insofar as the rules
have been adopted by legislation, judicial precedent or established usages. 0 4)
Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is conceptually more
divergent in its application than subject matter jurisdiction. Traditionally,
jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party
and his submission to authority, in contrast to the acquisition of jurisdiction over
the plaintiff the moment he files suit. General jurisdiction is largely undisputed
where the suit is brought in the forum court of the defendant's domicile or place of
business/incorporation. In tort cases in particular, the forum court of the place
where the tortious act occurred, the place where the injury resulted (variants include
the court of the place 'where the harmful event occurred' or 'where the harmful
effects are felt), 0 5 and the domicile of the defendant may acquire jurisdiction. 106
However a more liberal (and necessarily more controversial) approach to
jurisdiction has been manifest in the cases brought in US courts invoking the
ATCA and the TVPA, where jurisdiction over the defendant requires a mere
physical presence, even transitory, of individual defendants, or in the case of
corporations, 'minimum contacts' of corporations doing business in the United
States. This concept of 'transitory' presence has been clearly rejected in the Hague
Conference's attempt to codify jurisdictional rules under the Convention on the
Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
implying that other bases for jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be
availed of only where litigation involves the domiciliaries of States that are not
parties to the Convention. For example, the United Kingdom, as a non-party to the
Convention, has applied 'transitory' presence as a basis for jurisdiction, whereas
France, another non-party to the Convention, has made use of the nationality of the
plaintiff or the defendant as a basis for jurisdiction. Admittedly, 'transitory'
presence and 'minimum contacts' have not found wide application in various
municipal courts, which primarily utilize the doctrine of forum non conveniens to
decline jurisdiction over the suit.
The argument for 'transitory' presence has been stretched to the extreme
by some publicists, 10 7 relying on the principle of universal jurisdiction0 8 under
104 Id.
10s BIRNIE, PATRICIA and ALAN BOYLE, at 277-279; See also Article 5 of the 1968 European
Community Convention onJurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments; 'Lotus case' (1927) PCIJ, Ser. A. No.
10.
106 Article 2 of the Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sept. 29, 1968, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1413 (1990).
107 Id. at note 103.
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international law. Universal jurisdiction dispenses with traditional links of residence
and nationality to permit courts to acquire subject matter and personal jurisdiction
in some limited cases (such as egregious human rights violations such as genocide,
crimes against humanity, and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions). Both in
theoretical treatment and actual state practice, universal jurisdiction has been
confined to criminal proceedings.'0 9 It is now argued that universal jurisdiction
may be a basis for acquiring jurisdiction even in civil cases based on the historical
right to compensation of human rights victims as a form of reparations, dating back
to the norms prohibiting piracy. Moreover, it is claimed that the 'right to an
effective remedy' under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights did not distinguish between
criminal and civil proceedings, such that the greater sanction (criminal prosecution)
should necessarily include the lesser (civil litigation). Finally, it is further claimed
that the accepted definition of 'impunity' (which is the evil addressed by universal
jurisdiction) recognizes the use of civil remedies:
Impunity.. .is the impossibility, de jure or de facto, of bringing the
perpetrators of human rights violations to account --- whether in criminal,
civil, administrative, or disciplinary proceedings. 1°
The use of universal jurisdiction to empower any forum court to accept
jurisdiction over civil tort claims (whose causes of action depend upon violations of
international law) from individual human rights victims throughout the world is
potentially dangerous and vexatious. It can itself be used as the means to cause
deprivations of individual human rights, especially when employed in a politically-
motivated manner. While the nature of torts and criminal actions in some
jurisdictions such as the United States show a strong kinship, the same may not be
said in other civil law countries such as the Philippines. Even the few countries that
apply universal jurisdiction (such as Belgium, France, Australia) have enacted
internal legislation to govern its use -- an implied recognition of the potential of
universal jurisdiction to disrupt foreign diplomacy and amicable relations between
States. At best, what may be accepted (although not clearly contemplated nor
provided for by treaty law nor customary law) is the pursuit of civil liability ex
108 Randall, Kenneth C. UnitersalJurisction Under InternationalLaw. 66 TEX. L. REV. 785 (1998);
See also Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction.
,09 Bassiouni, M. Cherif. Uniersal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspeives and
Contemporay Practice. VIRG. J. I.L. 82 (2001); Sadat, Leila. Redefining UnihersalJurisdctio NEW ENG. L.
REV. 256 (2001).Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d, 571 (1985); Federation Nationale des Deportes et
Internes Resistants et Patriotes and Others v. Barbie, 78 ILR 125 (Fr. Cour de Cassation 1985); Touvier, 100
ILR 338 (Fr. Cour de Cassation 1992); Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 ILR
277 (Israel Sup. Ct. 1962); Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Judgment, ICTY Trial Chamber II, 7 May 1997.
110 Stephens, Beth. Gtil Lawsuit as a Remedyfor International Human Rights Violations Against Women, 5
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L. J. 143, 165-69 (1994).
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delicti or arising from the crime. This type of civil claim would not altogether
sever the use of universal jurisdiction in criminal proceedings, but would still
recognize the valid claims for damages by individual human rights victims. It
would, however, preclude the unfettered use of universal jurisdiction throughout
the world to unduly harass alleged perpetrators of human rights violations due to
the far-reaching consequences of tort litigations on their property rights.
Should civil litigation for human rights violations be pursued ex delicti (or as
arising from the international crime covering the human rights violation), it is
submitted that rules on jurisdiction for money laundering offences may have some
persuasion. While money laundering admittedly constitutes an international
crime' 1 , it has a distinct nature from other international offenses due to the use of
civil forfeitures (characterized as civil, rather than criminal proceedings) alongside
criminal prosecution. Jurisdiction for civil forfeitures accompanying criminal
prosecution of money laundering offenses has been predicated on two theories
under private international law: the ubiquity theory (which states that an offense
is deemed to have taken place on the territory of a state as soon as a constituent or
essential element of the offense has taken place on the said territory), and the
effects doctrine (which grants jurisdiction where the effect of an offense is
produced in the territory of a state, even if the effect is not a constitutive element of
the offense). 112
As regards issues on choice of law in civil litigations for human rights
violations, there is no discernible 'heavy' consensus. Traditional tort doctrine in
products liability cases employs kx loc delicti commissi, or the law of the place where
the alleged tort was committed. In common law jurisdictions (which may subscribe
to the vested rights theory), the reckoning point for the 'commission' of the alleged
tort is the 'place where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged
tort occurs'. Civil law jurisdictions, on the other hand, trace the 'commission' of
the alleged tort to the 'place where the tortious conduct was committed'. 113 The
Alien Tort Claims Act in the United States expands the choice of law to torts
'committed in violation of the law of nations', thus opening judicial application of
customary norms under international law. (It may be noted that under Article 10 of
the Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and
M STESSENS, GUY. MONEY LAUNDERING: A NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT MODEL. (2000).
112 See also Apartheid Convention; UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime;
Convention on Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes; Arts. 6 and 7 of the Convention on Civil
Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment, June 21, 1993, reproduced in
32 I.L.M. 1228.
113 1973 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability.
2004] UBI Jus NON REMEDIUM 455
Commercial Matters," 4 tort jurisdiction has been restricted to genocide, crimes
against humanity, and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.) 115
Finally, the recognition and enforcement of judgments even in civil
litigations for human rights violations would still be based on reciprocity rules
across various jurisdictions' 1 6 The practice of states has been to treat foreign
judgments under the rubric of the municipal doctrine of resjudicata, and to exercise
significant restraints on recognition or enforcement. This is exemplified the
aforementioned Draft Convention, which makes supplementary agreements
mandatory for all Contracting Parties before they can recognize or enforce a
decision rendered in another Contracting State, denies enforcement of a foreign
judgment when a specified period of time has elapsed, and requires enforceability of
the judgment both in the State of origin and the enforcing State.
IV. Illustrative case: The 'Jugun Ianfu' of World War II
The 'Jugun Ianfu' (the Japanese term for those otherwise known as the
'comfort women') of World War II, presents a cogent illustration of the common
issues affecting human rights victims' right to effective remedies. While the
suffering of this class of claimants is well documented," 7 their desire for redress
remains unmet by the remedies system of international human rights law, through
no fault of their own.
Individual claimants have tried to obtain an official apology from the
Japanese Government, as well as actual and moral damages for the atrocities
perpetrated against them during World War II. None of these reliefs have ever
been granted in any forum court. To date the only somewhat positive results for
the Jugun Ianfu are the: (1) 1948 Batavia Military Trials" 8 that convicted 11
Japanese officers and comfort station operators for committing war crimes against
Dutch women forced to work in comfort stations in the Dutch East Indies and the
114 Found at http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.htm (last visited November 10, 2003).
115 Von Mehren, Arthur T. Drafting a Convention on International Jurisdction and the Effects of Forign
Judgments Acceptabk Worldade: Can the Hague Conference Project Succeed?, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 191 (2001).
116 Kessedjian, Catherine. "Hague Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments", Law in Transition: Advancing Legal Reform, European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, Autumn, 2000, p. 5.
17 K. Parker and J. Chew, Compensation forJapan's World War H.IWar-Rape Victims, 17 hASTINGS
INT'L. & COMp. L. REV. 497, 508 (1994); G. HICKS, THE COMFORT WOMEN: JAPAN'S BRUTAL REGIME OF
ENFORCED PROSTITUTION IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR 164-65 (1994); K. ASKIN, WAR CRIMES AGAINST
WOMEN: PROSECUTION IN INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS, (1997); Y. TANAKA, HIDDEN
HORRORS: JAPANESE WAR CRIMES IN WORLD WAR 11, 99 (1996).
118 Y. YOSHIAKI, COMFORT WOMEN, 43 (2000).
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Yamashita and Kuroda cases of the IMT for the Far East (which did not expressly
deal with liability for the comfort women stations but imposed criminal liability for
mass rapes and violence against women committed by Japanese forces during the
war); (2) Former Japanese Prime Minister Murayama's 'vague apology' in 1995119;
(3) The 15 October 2001 (also somewhat vague) personal apology by then Japanese
Prime Minister Juichiro Koizumi to Korean victims of World War II; (4) The
alleged establishment of an "Asian Women's Fund" privately financed by Japanese
corporations and individuals, not the Japanese government; (5) Only one case in the
Japanese courts which was NOT dismissed 20 where the lower found that Japan
violated a Japanese governmental tort statute by failing to take some action
following a 1993 governmental report that acknowledged the Japanese
government's role involving the "comfort women" and awarded the plaintiffs a
nominal sum that reflected the Diet's failure but did not compensate the plaintiffs
for their actual wrongs. (Unfortunately, the Japanese Supreme Court reversed this
ruling.)
Even in the liberal US district courts, ATCA Litigation against the Japanese
government has yielded dismal results. In the landmark case of Hwang Geum Joo v.
Japan2 l, the US district court denied jurisdiction on two principal grounds:
(1) The States of the victims waived their claims under the
San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan;
(2) Japan as a sovereign State cannot be sued under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, since none of the
FSIA exceptions apply.
Critics of the decision122 raise the following objections:
119 The statement reads: "During a certain period in the not-too-distant past, Japan, after adopting
a mistaken national policy, marched down the path to war and provoked a crisis jeopardizing the very survival
of our people. Japan's colonial rule and aggression inflicted immense harm and suffering upon people in many
countries, especially in other Asian countries. I humbly acknowledge these irrefutable facts of history, express
my deep remorse once again, and offer an apology from the bottom of my heart, in the hope that no such
mistake will ever be made in the future. I also offer my sincere condolences to all the victims of this period of
history in Japan and abroad." Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, Statement Issued on the Fiftieth
Anniversary of the end of World War I I (Aug. 15, 1995).
120 See 'Comfort Women" Caie: Judgment of April27, 1998, Shimonoseki Branch, Yamaguchi Prefectural
Court, Japan, 8 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'Y J. 63-100; B. Fisher, Japan's Postiwr Compensation ilhtiaion, 22 WHIlTIER
L. REv. 35, 36 (2000).
12 Id. at 88.
'2- S. Lee, Comforting the Comfort Women: Who Can Make Japan Pay? UNIV. PENN. J. INT'L & ECON.
L. (Summer, 2003); S. Park, Broken Silnce: Redressing the Mass Rape and Sexual Enslatrement of Asian Women by the
Japanese Goternment in an Appropriate Forum, ASIA-PAC. L. & POL'Y. J. (Winter, 2002).
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(1) Nowhere in the text of the San Francisco Peace Treaty
was individual criminal accountability as well as state
responsibility for international crimes waived by the
Parties to the Treaty; in any case, States cannot waive the
human rights violation and injury claims of its citizens;
(2) Japan is covered under 2 exceptions to the FSIA, namely,
the express or implied waiver of immunity (allegedly
made by Japan in the Potsdam Declaration) or the
foreign state commercial activity exception that has
a direct effect on the United States (where the
comfort women system was held to be such a
commercial activity which affected the US due to the
medical expenses and other recovery expenses it was
forced to incur for comfort women left by Japanese
forces in the Philippines).
There has been ceaseless debate about the validity of the issues
aforementioned in permitting individual claimants to file cases under the ATCA in
US courts, with strong support advanced for critics of the Hwang decision.
At present, litigation in Japanese courts has had little, if any, success.
Government officials are reluctant to sue Japan for wartime atrocities given
political-economic considerations, such as Japan's Official Development Assistance
to developing countries and favorable foreign policy relations with influential actors
in the international community such as the United States.
Given the improbability of obtaining favorable verdicts in Japanese
national courts or in the United States district courts (much less even the mere
acquisition of jurisdiction), what other forum for redress is available to the Jugun
Ianfu, if any?
It is submitted that a case may be brought by the States of the individual
claimants against the State of Japan before the International Court of Justice. To
state briefly, the state responsibility of Japan may be predicated on two grounds:
(1) The attribution to the State of Japan of the operation of the
comfort station system as an internationally wrongful act for
which reparations are proper;
(2) The continued failure of the State of Japan to prosecute
individuals who committed war crimes and crimes against
humanity (sexual enslavement, torture and rape) against the
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Jugun Ianfu amounts to a breach of the aut dedere aut
judicare principle and the denial of justice and effective
remedies to the Jugun Ianfu for which reparations are proper.
On the first ground. It may be argued that the operation of the comfort women
system was part of government policy of the Japanese government, implemented by
military authorities including General Yamashita.' 23 The comfort women system
could be characterized as sexual enslavement, torture and rape, all of which
constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity.124 The operation of the comfort
women system could be directly attributed to the State of Japan as government acts
committed by its agents under actual authority (doctrine of objective
responsibility). 25 The internationally wrongful acts (operation of comfort women
system amounting to sexual enslavement, torture and rape) being attributable to the
Japan, its international responsibility may be engaged. 126
On the second ground. It may be further argued that there is now a customary
norm of international law requiring States to prosecute perpetrators of war crimes
and crimes against humanity127, or to provide victims of such crimes with effective
123 In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1945); Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, 1948 L. REP. WAR.
CRIM. 1, 35-37 (1945); M. Lippman, Humanitarian Law: The Uncertain Contours of Command Renponsibiiy, 9
TULSAJ. COMP. & INT'L. L. (Fall, 2001).
124 A. Korkeakivi, Consequences of Higber' International Lan- Evaluating Crimes of State and Erga Omnes,
J.INT'L.L. 82, 110-113 (1996); 1863 Lieber Code, Instructions for the Government of the United States in the
Field by Order of the Secretary of War" 24 April 1863, General Orders No. 100; Art. II(1)(c) of the CHARTER
OF ALLIED CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, PUNISHMENT OF PERSONS GUILTY OF WAR CRIMES, CRIMES
AGAINST PEACE AND AGAINST HUMLNITY, 3 Official Gazette Control Council for Germany 50-55 (1946);
Art.5(c) of the CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST, approved and
published by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) 1946; arts. 14 and 97 of GENEVA
CONVENTION III; Art. 27 of GENEVA CONVENTION IV; Art. 76(1) of PROTOCOL I; Art. 4(2)(e) of
PROTOCOL II; Art. 5(g) of the Amended Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia , S.C. Res. 827 25 May 993, last amended by S.C. Res. 1329 (2000); Art. 3(g) of the Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, last amended by S.C. Res. 1329 (2000); Art. 7(l)(g) of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/*9). The ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT (ICC) entered into force on 1 July 2002 and it is expected that the Court will be operational
in 2004.
I's Caire claim (France v. Mexico), 5 RIAA 516 (1929). See also Corfu Channel Case (UK v.
Albania) (Merits) I.C.J. Reports (1949) on the use of indirect or circumstantial evidence of facts giving rise to
responsibility.
126 Articles 1-3, 5, 12 and 28 of the ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNATIONALLY
WRONGFUL ACTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, U.N. doc. A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1 (2001). The
International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility. For a useful background of the
Second Reading of the Draft Articles see: J. Crawford, J. Peel, S. Olleston, The ILC's Articles on Responsibiity of
States for Internationally VrongfulActs: Completion of the Second Rea&ng. 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 963 (2001).
127 D. Orenticher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rghts Violations of a Prior Regime,
100 YALE L. J. 2537 (1991); C. Joyner, Redressing Impunity for Human Rights Violations: The Universal
Declaration and the Search for Accountability 26 DENV. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 591, 613 (1998); See also H.
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remedies 128 . By repeatedly refusing to prosecute its own officials (even Emperor
Hirohito) or to provide for a civil claims commission or some other forum that
would permit the Jugun Ianfu access to effective remedies, Japan may be held
internationally responsible.
Another alternative is also dependent upon the initiatives taken by the
States of the individual Jugun Ianfu claimants. The States may try to negotiate an
agreement with Japan to create arbitration or claims commissions that would decide
on individual cases. Admittedly, States may not be compelled under any
international legal obligation to enter into such negotiations.
A final possible forum rests with the national courts of the individual
Jugun Ianfu claimants themselves. The caveats to this course of action are the
acquisition of jurisdiction by the forum court (governed by the laws of the forum),
and the ability of the forum court to execute and enforce its judgments (should
there be favorable judgments for the Jugun Ianfu). As discussed in the previous
section, any favorable result from litigation in national courts may amount to
nothing more than symbolic victories.
As with any other international human rights case, the Jugun Ianfu case
demonstrates (albeit to a more exaggerated degree), the three 'stasis' points affecting
the individual claimants' rights to effective remedies (as discussed in Part II). It also
highlights the intricacies of state involvement in advancing individual claims, and
gives weight to the inversely proportional correlation (between success in the
individual claim and the severity of liability sought by the claimant) also proposed in
Part II.
GRoTIus, DE JJURE BELLI ET PACIS (THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE), ch. XXI, sec. IV (1) at 347
(W.Whewell trans. & ed. 1853); Art 5 of the CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE
CRIME OF GENOCIDE, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280; Art 49 of GENEVA CONVENTION I; Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 UNTS 277 (1948); Art.50 of Geneva Convention
II; Art. 129 of Geneva Convention III; Art. 146 of Geneva Convention IV; Art. 7 of the TORTURE
CONVENTION; Art. 4 of the United Nations Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, 754 U.N.T.S. 73 (1968).
129 Art. 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948); Art.2 (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16)
at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force 23 Mar. 1976; Arts. 1.1, 2, and 7 of the
American Convention 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40), U.N. Doc. No. A/37/40 (1982); American
Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 entered into force 18 July 1978,
reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System,
OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.l at 25 (1992); Art. 13 of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (1950).
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Conclusion
Do international human rights norms have any coercive force in reality,
against States, State agents, and non-State actors? It is a relevant question,
particularly since the raging academic debate has largely been directed towards the
substantive norms of international human rights law, while very little analytical
treatment has been accorded to the adjective or procedural norms for the
enforcement of international human rights law- It is submitted that the coercive
force of the substantive norms still exist, insofar as they codify acceptable standards
and prohibitions on human conduct and State behavior. However, human rights
norms lose potency precisely due to the difficulty for injured victims to prove
accountability for breaches of these norms, and to exact corresponding redress for
such breaches. If States and individuals voluntarily observe human rights norms
out of some level of deterrence, it is predictable that weakening remedial justice for
individual victims will dilute voluntary observance of the norms.
Given the inherent weaknesses of the international remedies system (which
is highly dependent on the consent and willingness of States to subject themselves
or their nationals to suit or any other form of claim), the individual human rights
victim, in deciding on a forum for redress and planning his/her subsequent
strategies, has no recourse except to familiarize himself/herself with the
procedures, reliefs, and limitations of various institutions for redress; recognize
the common 'stasis' points that will affect the pursuit of his/her claim; and take
into account the correlation between the success of his/her claim and the severity
of liability he/she seeks to establish. This work hopes to assist the individual
human rights claimant in those respects.
Since States are the ultimate arbiters of the success or failure of an
individual human rights claim, there is a greater imperative for coherent rules to be
agreed upon by them, particularly in individual civil liability suits (criminal
proceedings largely being institutionalized with the ICC) involving the usual 'stasis'
points for individual claimants: jurisdiction, extent of authority, enforcement and
execution of judgment. Until and unless the 'secondary' rules are widely agreed
upon by States, neither States nor individual litigants can expect the 'primary' rules
to accomplish their objects and purposes in international human rights law.
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